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This article examines the relationship between Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and 
the Sphere Project.  Prior to revisiting the concerns MSF had with the project, it looks 
at factors that give rise to differences between NGOs and cites some reasons for why 
an organisation such as MSF would not embrace such a project and clarifies some key 
elements of MSF-style humanitarianism.  The author revisits the original concerns and 
arguments presented by MSF when it decided not to participate beyond assisting with 
the establishment of technical standards and key indicators for the handbook.  This is 
followed by a critical discussion examining these concerns and counter-criticism with 
reference to experiences a few years after the inception of Sphere.  It concludes with 
MSF’s perceptions and stance regarding Sphere and accountability in 2003. 
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Preamble 
The Sphere Project came into being as a consequence of the crisis in Rwanda in 1994 
and the catastrophic level of death there.  The evaluation done in its aftermath 
coincided with a drive to find ways to improve NGO performance and establish means 
for accountability.  Prevailing discourse was focused on the failure of aid whereas the 
political actors and their responsibilities received relatively scant attention and 
accountability was viewed as the responsibility of NGOs for their actions in front of the 
donors and the recipients.  The end result was a Handbook of Minimum Standards, a 
Humanitarian Charter and the adoption of the Red Cross Code of Conduct by 
participating NGOs.  There was also the preliminary establishment of a body for 
members of a recipient population to air a grievance against an NGO by means of the 
Humanitarian Ombudsman Project — now the Humanitarian Accountability Project 
International (HAPi).  
  MSF was an active participant with the development of the Sphere handbook 
during Phase I of the Sphere Project (1997–8) when the technical guidelines and the 
Humanitarian Charter were developed.  It also became a signatory to the Red Cross 
Code of Conduct.  Although guidelines already existed such as Oxfam’s Nutrition 
Guidelines and UNHCR’s Emergencies Handbook, MSF believed it to be a 
professional responsibility to share its technical expertise and provide input.  What was 
produced was viewed by MSF to be a catalogue of agreed minimum technical 
standards and key indicators that would be useful as a guideline to ensure a greater   Questionable Accountability:  MSF and Sphere in 2003   177     
   
 
 
degree of quality in an emergency intervention.  Within MSF there was debate and 
some dissension but it was officially decided that it would not participate in Phase II, 
including the training programmes (1998–2000) and Phase III for dissemination and 
implementation (2000–03). 
  There was no question that the development and dissemination of best 
technical standards was seen as valuable and necessary.  However, there were concerns 
about possible counterproductive effects that this project taken as a whole could 
generate.  Despite the Humanitarian Charter and Code of Conduct, it was felt that there 
was an emphasis on the use of a technical approach by the use of Minimum Standards 
and key indicators as a means for ensuring quality and accountability.  Although better 
quality relief from a technical perspective was seen as important, it was not believed to 
be the solution to the fundamental issue underpinning a humanitarian crisis.  This being 
the fact that in most crises, the majority of death and suffering during conflict and/or 
displacement is caused by the lack of political will for ensuring the welfare and 
protection of a vulnerable population. 
  These concerns were shared by a number of other predominately French 
agencies.  Unfortunately, these diverging opinions became characterised as a Franco-
Anglo divide and were caricatured by the notorious ‘French Letter’.
1  Subsequent to 
this division, Koenraad Van Brabant wrote an article discussing and analysing the 
various objections about Sphere and the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project (Van 
Brabant, 2000).  Although he clearly articulated the concerns of the two camps, the 
article did not really fully capture the rationale of the core MSF position.  What he 
touched upon, but did not explore, is the Sphere Project in relation to the philosophical 
underpinnings, different political and cultural origins and typologies of NGOs.  In 
addition, the different mandates, or in effect, self-accorded mandates, need to be 
understood.  These aspects are crucial; they will inherently affect perceptions of the 
usefulness of the Sphere Project.  
  Considering the latter point, prior to discussing concerns with the Sphere 
Project, this paper will start with an outline of general differences between NGOs and 
briefly present MSF’s identity and approach to humanitarian action.  The original 
position and objections of MSF regarding the Sphere Project will be reviewed and then 
these objections will be discussed considering some of the counter-criticism and in 
light of lessons learned a few years down the track (with reference to situations of 
violence rather than natural disasters).  The final section will discuss what MSF’s 
position is in 2003 with respect to Sphere, accountability and an overview of the 
current challenges we face as an organisation for humanitarian action.  
The myth of ‘homogeneous humanitarians’ 
Not all humanitarians are the same and to use the terms ‘humanitarian’ and especially 
‘NGO’, as though there is an agreed generic definition, is misleading.  Using a broad 
and literal definition, Al-Qaeda could be classified as an NGO.  Several reasons for 
differing views of how to respond to humanitarian needs and what is defined as 
humanitarian assistance, rests with some aspects of the character of an organisation 
formed by its tradition, political and cultural heritage, typology and self-accorded 
mandate.  Admittedly, to define an organisation by these crude parameters can render 
the process of definition to that of stereotyping, or even caricature.  Furthermore, 
tradition will have an impact on typology as will political and cultural heritage.          Jacqui Tong 
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Nevertheless, some core features can be disentangled and the stereotype, while lacking 
in depth and texture, can define aspects of an NGO’s essence and is a useful means for 
a broad differentiation.        
Tradition 
One of the key influences lies with what tradition an organisation stems from.  A paper 
by Abby Stoddard defined three broad historical avenues (2003).  There are 
organisations that have their roots in religion and may or may not express any of their 
core religious beliefs in their action.  Their aid is delivered in the spirit of service and 
free giving.  Another category is termed ‘Wilsonian’ referring to former US president 
Woodrow Wilson who had the ambition to project US values and influence as a force 
for good.  Wilsonian NGOs do not find any particular incompatibility between 
humanitarian aims and US policy. The third category is where MSF has its roots, that 
of ‘Dunantist’ style humanitarianism, which traces its origins back to Henri Dunant and 
the Red Cross where the idea of classical humanitarianism and the corresponding 
principles were formed (Stoddard, 2003: 28).  The Red Cross claims independence 
from government, politics and religion to operate relief activities in armed conflict 
situations. 
  Even though MSF was formed by breaking with a Red Cross rule — that of 
keeping silent when faced with breaches of International Humanitarian Law and abuse 
of a population — its underpinnings remain in the ‘Dunanatist’ tradition.  Three key 
principles defined by the Red Cross and which are included in the MSF charter are 
neutrality, impartiality and independence.  
Political and cultural heritage 
Another reason for inter-agency differences is the result of the particular culture from 
which an organisation stems.  Anglo-Saxon NGOs come from a culture in which the 
relationship between them and government tends to be more collaborative and 
participative reflecting that of the relationship between civil society and government in 
general.  As an example not directly linked with humanitarian action is the 
institutionalisation of the interface between civil society and the government in the UK 
by means of quasi-autonomous NGOs (Quango).  A Quango is a body that has a role in 
the processes of national government but is not a part of one, and which accordingly 
operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers.
2 
  Further differentiation needs to be made between NGOs in the UK and US. 
For the latter, stemming from Wilsonian precepts, they inherently share a more 
comfortable and collaborative relationship with their government.  In the case of the 
UK, although NGOs such as Oxfam can have strong relationships with governmental 
bodies, they can also be confrontational and are considered to be more Dunantist in 
their tradition (Stoddard, 2003). 
  Although MSF is now an international movement, it has ‘Latin’ roots, 
whereby there tends to be an adversarial relationship between NGOs and governmental 
powers.  This is reflected in the relationship between civil society and government in 
France.  Political heritage is also a crucial factor and in Europe political life has been 
built through a mixture of evolution and revolution.  This legacy is expressed by 
different approaches to solicit change: by denunciation and external pressure as well as   Questionable Accountability:  MSF and Sphere in 2003   179     
   
 
 
working inside the system to participate in the process of evolution.  The different 
political and cultural heritage will have an impact on perceptions about the usefulness 
and appropriateness of a project, which calls for strong and long-term collaboration 
with governments.  The MSF approach can be described as ‘disobedient 
humanitarianism’ in contrast to the Wilsonian ‘state humanitarianism’.
3 
Typology 
As well as tradition and political and cultural heritage, the typology of an NGO also 
contributes important elements to its character.  There are models that focus on the 
emphasis an organisation places on humanitarian values, or to what extent they 
cooperate with governing powers.  One of the most informative models of typology is 
known as the O’Malley and Dijkzel’s mental map of large international NGOs 
(Stoddard, 2003).  As well as looking at the weight applied to the values they uphold, 
this model gives nuance to the way an NGO relates to its governing powers.  There is a 
vertical axis ranging between the values of independence versus the willingness to 
work more as a public service contractor.  Similarly, there is a horizontal axis ranging 
from impartiality — where aid is delivered proportionally according to needs and needs 
alone as the only determinant — towards solidarity where aid is given in favour of a 
particular group.  
  MSF is described as lying closer to the corner where there is a convergence of 
independence and impartiality.  These principles are strongly valued to the extent that 
independence is viewed as a necessary condition to be able to deliver humanitarian 
assistance in an impartial manner.  Other NGOs may be more inclined to undertake 
public service contracts or skew the balance of resource allocation in a gesture of 
solidarity.  This partly explains why MSF finds it difficult to agree to participate in a 
broad project that frames quality and accountability with an emphasis on technical 
outputs as important baseline determinants for the effectiveness of an intervention.  
Mandate and scope of action 
An organisation’s mandate also needs to be considered or, more precisely, their self-
accorded mandate or scope of action.  Under international law, UN bodies such as 
UNHCR (Refugee Conventions) and the ICRC (Geneva Conventions) have legally 
recognised mandates, while NGOs do not.  However, most NGOs use international 
legal instruments as points of reference for their activity and talk in terms of a mandate. 
Some NGOs are described as ‘multi-mandated’ encompassing development as well as 
relief, and aspects of developmental interventions are brought into their relief work as 
an essential part of humanitarian action.  
  There are many theories of developmental aid but most are underpinned by the 
notion that efforts should be biased towards giving aid to those who can help others 
with the objective of more long-term benefits.  In the classical sense, humanitarian 
action is about action taken in contexts of violence and destruction, not developmental 
situations although these lines are frequently blurred and many contexts are mercurial. 
The principle guiding relief actions in time of armed conflict are different: aid being 
given on the basis of need and need alone.  Organisations that are ‘multi-mandated’ are 
inherently more willing and able to embrace the Sphere Project as it articulates rights        Jacqui Tong 
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that must be considered with project implementation and it incorporates aspects of 
developmental orthodoxy.  
  MSF is said to have a ‘single-mandate’ and frames its work using the 
fundamental principles of independence and impartiality for humanitarian action, even 
in more developmental contexts.  It does not systematically employ developmental 
concepts but some elements will be used when contextually appropriate.  Yet many 
contexts are in reality conflict related or with socially repressed populations.  Although 
the long-term is factored into decision-making, the focus tends to be on immediate 
needs.  In such situations aspects of a developmental approach such as participation, 
although fundamentally important, will be sidelined if it is seen that this process has 
been politicised for individual or group gain.  Some supporters of the Sphere Project 
have argued that participation is integral to the point that it was seen as a vital 
component to define aspects of quality and accountability.
4  Therefore, in this respect 
the demands of Sphere would at times be at odds with the MSF ‘mandate’.  
MSF-style humanitarianism 
Using the above framework, MSF can be defined as an organisation that is clearly 
focused, principled, adversarial — very much the disobedient humanitarians. 
Nevertheless, to understand fully MSF’s decision to decline to participate further with 
Sphere, it is important to give more texture and depth as to who and what MSF is.  
Principles and pragmatism 
As much as NGOs are not homogeneous, neither is MSF, but there are shared values, 
principles and elements that define its operations.  As MSF is a medical humanitarian 
organisation there is a commitment to universal medical ethics, which is underpinned 
by demands of: the duty to do good (beneficence), to do no harm (non-malfeasance), 
autonomy (confidentiality, informed consent and privacy) and justice. As a Dunantist 
organisation it holds at its core some key principles: neutrality, impartiality and 
independence.  These principles are not absolute and sacrosanct, but are critical guides.  
They are what underpins an action as being humanitarian and are also a means to 
negotiate through the labyrinthine nature of the complex contexts where humanitarian 
assistance is needed.  
  As much as the principles are extremely important, MSF is not naive and has 
to be pragmatic in certain contexts.  In order to respond to a ‘humanitarian imperative; 
that is, to alleviate the suffering of a vulnerable population out of respect for human 
dignity, occasionally they are subject to trade-offs.  That is, to be given different 
weightings according to the demands of a context in order to deliver the needed 
assistance’ (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2002: 140–43).  It is not within the scope of this paper 
to debate the usefulness or even appropriateness of neutrality, but in general, 
impartiality and independence have the greater weight for the decisional calculus, 
should there be a clash or dilemma.   
  Another key feature is the framework used in deciding whether to undertake 
humanitarian assistance and how to carry it out, is that of being able to deliver aid 
within the realms of  ‘humanitarian space’.  This is defined as having independent 
access to the affected population and unhindered dialogue with them, and to ensure that   Questionable Accountability:  MSF and Sphere in 2003   181     
   
 
 
the assistance delivered is received by those for whom it is intended.  On that basis, 
there is acute awareness that aid can feed a conflict or a regime causing the 
humanitarian crisis and there is ongoing analysis performed to ensure programme 
orientation will mitigate this.
5  Moreover, MSF has withdrawn aid when it has 
determined that it is aiding and abetting parties to a conflict or increasing the level of 
violence for the affected population. 
Operational characteristics 
The overall objective of humanitarian action is to alleviate suffering, which as a 
medical organisation means to act to reduce morbidity and mortality.  At the core of 
MSF is the quality of the medical activities.  Many guidelines have been produced in 
response to a variety of medical emergencies.
6  However, sometimes the Minimum 
Standards have to be abandoned.  In some cases what ought to be achieved can simply 
not be done but action must be taken — being the duty to do good.  Therefore, the 
ability to be pragmatic is to acknowledge that there is a duty to act even when there is 
awareness that in some cases the guidelines and indicators cannot be adhered to.  In 
these circumstances a contextual adaptation for the best possible outcome must be 
made.  Clear examples can be found when responding to unexpected epidemics.  In the 
case of cholera, there are specific guidelines on how to set up a cholera treatment unit.  
There have been cases when an epidemic appears out of season and because of resource 
constraints, a rapid response is implemented without initially meeting the guideline 
standards to ensure the objective of reduction of morbidity and mortality.  
  Another fundamental operational specificity is the action of témoinage, 
commonly known as witnessing and speaking out.  The founders of MSF did not 
believe medical humanitarian aid should be a blind and dumb instrument.  However, 
this action is often misunderstood as lobbying or advocacy.  Furthermore, it has also 
been misrepresented as championing human rights and denouncing corruption and 
injustice wherever they exist (as stated in Fox, 2001: 281, quoting Alain Woodrow in 
The Tablet, 1999).  For MSF, témoinage is about ‘witnessing’ and thereafter 
denunciation when breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or human rights 
or universal medical ethics have been witnessed and where basic humanitarian 
operational principles have been violated.  The speaking-out phase is employed when 
humanitarian action can do no more, or when the action is fuelling the cause of the 
humanitarian crisis. 
  Other characteristics of MSF are that operational activities are undertaken 
with respect to the values of proximity, transparency and accountability.  Guiding legal 
standards are those of international humanitarian law, the refugee conventions and 
human rights norms and law.  Other key features are those of the spirit of volunteerism, 
associativeness, self-criticism and frequent internal debate and confrontation. 
The question of ‘homogenised humanitarianism’ 
The Sphere Project, with its Humanitarian Charter and the handbook of Minimum 
Standards has the dual purpose of increasing the effectiveness of humanitarian 
assistance and making humanitarian agencies more accountable.  The Humanitarian 
Ombudsman Project was conceived as the means for airing grievances against NGOs        Jacqui Tong 
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which fail to perform.  The book was a result of more than two years of inter-agency 
collaboration and the standards covered for disaster assistance are: water supply and 
sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning and health services.  A qualifier 
is given in the introduction to the handbook: 
 
While the Charter is a general statement of humanitarian principles, the Minimum 
Standards do not attempt to deal with the whole spectrum of humanitarian 
concerns or actions. First, they do not cover all the possible forms of humanitarian 
assistance.  Second and more importantly, they do not deal with the larger issues of 
humanitarian protection. 
MSF’s original objections 
Referring back to MSF’s stereotype, for an organisation that tends to be confrontational 
to authority and fiercely independent, long-term commitment and close collaboration 
with a broad spectrum of NGOs and governmental authorities would be like wearing a 
hair-shirt.  Furthermore, how MSF defines the quality of humanitarian action clearly 
goes beyond technical standards.  Therefore, a project such as Sphere would 
automatically provoke debate and the decision not to remain involved was decided after 
internal debate with some dissension.  Nevertheless, beyond any debate and the 
caricature of MSF, there were key concerns about the Sphere Project.  
  From the outset, MSF never objected to the idea of good quality technical 
standards, the problems rested with linking quality and accountability to technical 
standards.  This can be exemplified by the hackneyed example — ‘there are a sufficient 
number of wells but women are raped to collect water’.  Even though there was an 
initial qualifier, there were major concerns were that this ambitious effort missed the 
key point of what contributes to death and suffering, that being the lack of protection 
for members of a vulnerable population.  Furthermore, despite the statement in the 
Humanitarian Charter regarding acknowledgement of the responsibilities of states, in 
reality there was a possibility that the onus for being accountable would rest on the 
shoulders of NGOs, rather than the behaviour of states and state actors.  Additionally, 
how does non-action of an NGO fit into the framework of accountability?  This 
concept of non-action can be extrapolated to those of the political powers, who could 
use the idea of technical standards to mask their responsibilities.  In an article by Pierre 
Perrin published by the ICRC, he sums up responsibilities regarding protection and 
accountability:  ‘The first responsibility of the humanitarian organisations is to bring 
their influence to bear on all the players to get them to assume their responsibilities to 
the victims and respect the rules governing the conduct of hostilities’ (2002, 26). 
The technical standards 
Although there was a strong platform for reflection and discussion during the process 
of handbook design, once written as rules, the handbook did tend towards being 
prescriptive, leaving little room for contextual adaptation.  Many of the defined 
technical standards, interventions and key indicators are minimalist and only applicable 
in an ideal refugee and displaced camp.  These standards also assume unhindered 
access to an affected population and adequate resources.  Furthermore, some of those 
standards are above and beyond what can be achievable in a hard emergency.  One size   Questionable Accountability:  MSF and Sphere in 2003   183     
   
 
 
does not fit all and many contexts require innovative and adaptive programming.  For 
some groups, the compulsion to adhere to the technical standards could lead to poor 
programming.  It was also feared that the perfect would become the enemy of the good: 
inability to adhere to Minimum Standards could lead to inaction on the part of some 
agencies, or a preference to run relief programmes in order to achieve the highest 
possibilities of ‘technical success’.  
Principles and politics  
Fiona Terry, the former director of research for MSF France, gave many aspects of the 
MSF critique in a previous publication for ODI (2000).  The Humanitarian Charter and 
the codes of conduct do not provide a hierarchy of principles for when reconciliation of 
competing principles is called for.  Sphere was said to have a misguided focus and 
risked reducing rather than expanding the scope for effective humanitarian action by 
focusing on the technical aspects.  A stark case as an example is that a group of NGOs 
working in Khmer-controlled refugee camps that praised the efficiency with which the 
Khmer Rouge organised these camps (Terry, 2000: 20). Furthermore, considerations of 
the political context were lacking.  By reducing the measure of success for response to 
humanitarian crises to the technical quantification and with the use of a humanitarian 
imperative as a mantra for triggering action, this would not allow for consideration for 
the fact that in some contexts, humanitarian assistance can kill not cure.  
  Beyond the political context there is the issue of the political powers.  The 
adherence to Sphere standards as an institutionalised norm further opened the window 
of seeing NGOs as merely good technical providers and used as such by donors 
governments.  By insisting on adherence to the technical standards as a prerequisite for 
funding, it would provide a mechanism through which donors could exert control over 
aid agencies.  If the standards are not achievable — or even appropriate — this could 
give rise to donor compliance for non-action.  Moreover, there has been an ongoing 
trend for governments to politicise humanitarian aid as much as it has done for 
development work. This trend affects an NGO’s ability to be independent.  As 
independence is seen to be a necessary condition for impartiality, the ability to deliver 
aid in a neutral and impartial manner would also be hampered.  
  Considering that Western political powers are the major donors, a tool such as 
Sphere also expanded the option for this sector of the international community to use 
humanitarian aid as the means ‘to be seen’ to have responded to a humanitarian crisis. 
As well as the donors being influential for either instigating an external political 
response or for applying pressure on political powers more directly implicated in a 
humanitarian crisis, the focus on the NGO being accountable would allow for 
abrogation of this responsibility.  This again highlights the key concern regarding the 
lack of accountability of state actors. 
The beneficiaries and accountability 
Another measure of quality invoked by Sphere was that of participation by the 
beneficiaries.  This is laudable but participation can be counter-productive in some 
contexts so how can it be used generically, even with nuance, to determine the quality 
of assistance?  More often than not there are deep divisions, and participation at the 
level of programme design can and often does seriously hinder the delivery of neutral        Jacqui Tong 
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and impartial assistance.  It needs to be remembered that Sphere and the Humanitarian 
Ombudsman Project were a consequence of the Rwandan crisis in Zaire.  In this 
specific context, those who were ‘representative’ of the population were the 
genocidairés.  This shows the danger of some well-intended concepts. 
  With respect to the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project and the appointment of 
an ombudsman who would listen to the concern of beneficiaries, it was feared that this 
could be easily manipulated by powerful elements to oppose agencies that did not act 
in their interests.  It would be unlikely that those suffering the most would be able to air 
grievances openly.  This aspect of the whole initiative is seen to be hypocritical.  This 
claim is made in light of placing the onus on victims to identify problems with 
humanitarian action, and would the absence of complaints signify all is well?  Such a 
process would also shift responsibility on to the shoulders of the victims, whereby they 
become the duty-bearers (Terry, 2000: 21).  
Sphere, MSF: a few years on 
Over time, lessons have been learned and some of the criticisms raised by MSF and 
others have been taken into consideration in an effort help the project to evolve.  This is 
particularly true for the fears about the inability to achieve the Minimum Standards 
leading to inaction.  The training modules give participants grounding in interpretation 
of the Humanitarian Charter and the technical demands of the handbook for making 
contextual adaptation.  The manual stipulates the need to interpret the standards within 
the specific context of each emergency.  If the Minimum Standards are unattainable 
then humanitarian organisations must provide explanations for why this is so. 
  The jury is still out about the use and effectiveness of the Sphere Project, and 
its implementation has encountered some difficulties for meeting objectives.  A case in 
point is that the handbook has been used more as a mere manual instead of guidelines 
that are just one part of the humanitarian response.  A recent report from the Overseas 
Development Institute states that the objective of the project in its attempt to marry 
rights with assistance — to combine the moral and legal force of rights with the 
specificities of needs statements — appears not to be working.  During field research 
for a needs assessment paper, the rights rationale underlying Sphere was not invoked at 
all by those interviewed, suggesting it is in danger of becoming a mere practice manual 
rather than an articulation of principle (Darcy and Hoffmann, 2003: 4).   
The technical standards 
Over time it has been observed that some fears expressed by MSF and others about the 
use of technical standards as a benchmark for accountability have been borne out. 
There is now clear rationale that although useful as guides, sometimes these standards 
clearly cannot or should not be used.  As an example of the former, there has been 
plenty of experience that the standards are simply not achievable, either through lack of 
access or resources.  In an evaluation of Sphere workshops in West Africa since mid-
1999 by Oxfam, some participants regretted the lack of a focus on protection. 
Furthermore, there was scepticism as to how they could be applied on the ground 
(Mompoint, 2000: 13).  More recently in Liberia, the population suffered from the 
deplorable violence and unambiguously suffered from a lack of protection during the   Questionable Accountability:  MSF and Sphere in 2003   185     
   
 
 
crisis in mid-2003; Sphere standards were clearly unattainable due to lack of access 
during the fierce fighting.  Even after the worst of the conflict, a fleeing population 
overwhelmed Monrovia and standards for water and sanitation were not at all 
achievable outside assigned IDP camps.  Despite the subsequent effort by NGOs, the 
quality achievable for the host population was below the Minimum Standards. To be 
able to reach these levels would have required a massive rehabilitation of the 
infrastructure.  
  Pertaining to when Sphere indicators should not be employed is when the 
impact on a whole population is analysed.  Deviation from Sphere (and MSF) standards 
would have allowed for a more effective response to the famine in southern Sudan in 
1998.  In this case study (Griekspoor and Collins, 2001: 742), an analysis was 
performed of an MSF intervention in response to a malnutrition crisis, even though 
those involved were aware that it was unrealistic to implement according to Sphere 
standards.  They stringently modified admission criteria to less than 60 per cent of 
weight for height (instead of 70 per cent).  Recovery rates fell below the norm of 75 per 
cent.  Had MSF deviated further from key indicators by admitting those that had more 
hope for recovery, they would have expanded their coverage and there would have 
been a better overall outcome for the affected population.  It was concluded that 
adherence to indicators in the face of overwhelming need with insufficient resources 
could promote inappropriate planning.  There needed to be a triage mechanism to find 
the balance between individual outcomes and overall coverage of a programme.  
Principles and politics 
With respect to the criticism about the lack of a hierarchy of principles and the possible 
adverse effects the highly technical approach to humanitarian assistance can generate, it 
is claimed that this can be solved by text analysis.  In an article written by Hugo Slim, 
he argues that there are sections in the charter and handbook that allow for a more 
liberal interpretation of whether or not to provide assistance and that the humanitarian 
imperative is not a Kantian categorical imperative (2002).  Although many NGO 
personnel have received formal training in Sphere standards, the charter and the code of 
conduct during implementation at the field level, it would be questionable if there were 
the ability to transfer sophisticated analysis on a consistent and effective basis. 
  The criticism about the misguided focus and the lack of emphasis about 
protection, respect for humanitarian principles and political considerations has found 
credence.  The most publicised example of the fear of negative effects being borne out 
lies in Asia.  No level of technical excellence would have resolved the fact that 
violations of humanitarian principles in North Korea made conditions impossible for 
international aid organisations.  The majority of those in need in North Korea were 
denied assistance from humanitarian agencies by the authorities.  The aid was used by 
the ruling powers to feed the regime and the population continued to suffer. 
  For fear of the donors using Sphere as a tool for NGO manipulation and to be 
public service contractors, donors do expect NGOs to use Sphere standards as the point 
of reference for the success of the project.  However, as to how much Sphere is used to 
exert control is not readily quantifiable.  This issue is muddied by the other 
politicisation trends for using NGOs as foreign policy tools coupled with the fact that 
some NGOs are more than willing to undertake subcontracting.  
        Jacqui Tong 
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The beneficiaries and accountability 
At this point, there is no clear and unambiguous evidence about the impacts at the field 
level about the relationship between the beneficiaries, accountability and the Sphere 
Project.
7  The Humanitarian Ombudsman Project, which sought to redress original 
concerns from beneficiaries, has evolved into HAPi as a body for self-regulation.   
However, it still absolves both the local authorities and the international community for 
people’s welfare by shifting the focus and responsibility for a population’s welfare on 
to NGOs.  Specifically for the case of Angola, donor governments and many NGOs 
failed to act to an inarguable need.  No one has been held accountable for this non-
action (Grien et al., 2003).  
Sphere and MSF in 2003 
In 2002 (and confirmed in 2003) the position of MSF has been stated as: ‘The 
Executive Committee of MSF, at a meeting on 11 October 2002, decided that MSF will 
not be involved with Sphere because MSF believes that that answer to the problem 
Sphere tries to tackle is political and not technical’.
8 
  This does not mean that MSF is against Sphere as a means to specify 
guidelines for better quality standards but the key objections remain unchanged for the 
overall project.  There are enough factors for MSF to re-affirm the decision not to 
participate further, and in 2003 to date there are no strong indicators that would lead a 
change of position.  There is acknowledgement and appreciation that the Sphere Project 
certainly improved awareness among NGOs about humanitarian action and the need to 
strive for good technical standards.  What remains under dispute is the question of 
accountability. 
  In his article, Van Brabant states that the elevation of the principle of 
independence to that of a sacred cow, whereby every external critical look at NGO 
performance is treated as a violation, risks becoming seen as an excuse to evade 
accountability (2000: 25).  This raises the question of how does MSF make itself 
accountable?  The answer remains linked to another ongoing debate: for what are we 
accountable?  However, many concerns regarding accountability are met by MSF.  
  For the aspect of financial accountability with reference to standards 
demanded by donors, MSF complies.  For private funds, as well as national law and 
maintenance of transparency, there are many internal checks and balances to ensure 
responsibility and accountability.  For technical standards are designed, evaluated and 
reformulated in conjunction with international organisations such as WHO, the Pasteur 
Institute and other international bodies as well as using internal expertise.  There is 
ongoing review of staff recruitment and as an average in field operations over 60 per 
cent of the personnel are qualified medical professionals.
9  For external examination 
and the possibility for peer review, MSF is an active participant in the Steering 
Committee for Humanitarian Relief (SCHR). 
  For the aspect of the quality and accountability of humanitarian action, the 
repeated reference to independence is not a method for evasion.  It is paramount that 
there is the ability to protect aid until it reaches the victims.  This is dependent on the 
necessary condition humanitarian space being those of:  
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•  There must be control over the distribution of aid, which must first be brought to 
those who need it most. 
•  There must be freedom to engage in dialogue with people in need. 
 
Referring back to the statement by Pierre Perrin, to be accountable means more than 
the delivery of quality technical standards; under IHL it also means a to apply pressure 
on the political powers to be accountable.  Under IHL it means as well that there is the 
duty to act and to take risks to protect and assist victims of violence. 
  The criticism by MSF and others was parodied in an editorial for the ICVA 
newsletter in June 2001 titled ‘McSphere’: Franchising Humanitarian Aid (Van 
Schenkenburg, 2001).  A scenario is given whereby in 2010 humanitarian aid is 
commercialised, the private sector will supply mass relief, civilians will undertake the 
soft-sector programmes and military will undertake the majority of activities in 
insecure situations.  Those who objected to Sphere will be silenced by the donor 
governments.  Unfortunately, in 2003 there is evidence to suggest that this is not such a 
wild fantasy.  
  The concern that Sphere could be a tool for manipulation of NGOs by donor 
governments in 2003 has now been sidelined by the fact that politicisation of aid is now 
unambiguous.  Moreover, there is also the drive to mainstream all those who respond to 
a humanitarian situation to behave in a fashion that meets a common political 
objective, usually cited as the laudable one of peace-building.  This means a 
consequentialist approach for a hoped-for political good at the cost of immediate needs 
as in the case of Angola (Grien et al., 2003).  
  This trend is underpinned by the use of a coherent approach to respond to 
humanitarian crises.  That is by means of a UN integrated response, incorporation of 
developmental and rights-based approaches through the NGOs, the military being 
incorporated as ‘humanitarian’ actors, donors becoming quasi-operational and more 
‘coordination, accountability and efficiency’ leading to a congested arena for trying to 
deliver humanitarian assistance.  It is also the result of the new security agenda post-11 
September.  It has been clearly stated by the US that NGOs are seen to be a part of the 
response to the global war on terror.  Humanitarian obligations have not changed since 
11 September but in the conflicts where the US and its allies are overtly involved, 
humanitarian space has been reduced.  This has been to the point that all Western actors 
in Iraq are being tarred with the same brush.  That is, even the truly independent NGOs 
are seen as part of the Coalition.  
  Another growing concern in 2003 and for the future is how the medical 
context has also evolved to a level needing a global response.  This refers to infectious 
diseases such as tuberculosis, drug-resistant malaria and specifically, HIV/AIDS, 
which is now seen as a medical priority with social, political and economic 
consequences.  There must be technical standards for appropriate medical response, but 
the implementation of these standards is constrained by lack of access to affordable 
medicines, the lack of infrastructure to deliver the medicines, global economic interests 
and the lack of committed political will.  
  To conclude on a point of reflection, there is what is termed as ‘Red Queen’ 
theory.  This is more about genetics but has been extrapolated to other disciplines, 
including social sciences (Ridley, 1993).  It stems from the Red Queen in Lewis 
Carroll’s Alice Through The Looking Glass.  The Red Queen kept running faster and 
faster but the more she ran, the more she stayed in the same place as the landscape kept 
moving as well. In the context of 2003, we are all running faster but either staying in        Jacqui Tong 
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the same place or maybe even slipping backwards.  In the world of humanitarian 
action, there is as much complexity and confusion in 2003 as there was in the mid- 
1990s.  This complexity and confusion, giving rise to new challenges, is where MSF’s 
energies must lie in order to respond more effectively to humanitarian emergencies. 
Notes 
1.   A letter signed by several French agencies citing their objections to Sphere. 
2.   UK government’s definition. 
3.   Terms attributed to the author David Reiff. 
4.   As stated by Salama et al., 2001. 
5.   Examples can be found in Terry, 2002 and in Braughman, 2001. 
6. Examples include: guides to cholera epidemics, vaccination campaigns against measles, 
refugee health, clinical guidelines for medical intervention, essential drug guidelines, 
nutritional guidelines, water and sanitation, hospital waste management, treatment for 
victims of sexual gender-based violence. 
7.  This aspect was subject to discussion during a workshop in London, November 2003.  It was 
generally agreed that actual impacts were unclear. 
8.   Stated in a letter to the field by Rafa Vila San Juan, MSF Secretary-General, 25 March 2003. 
9.   Doctors, nurses, technicians and paramedics. 
References     
Bouchet-Saulnier, F. (2002) Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law.  Rowman and Littlefield, 
Oxford. 
Braughman, R. (2001) Humanitarian Responsibility.  ICRC, Geneva. 
Buchanan-Smith, M. (2003) How the Sphere Project Came into Being: A Case Study of Policy 
Making in the Humanitarian Aid Sector and the Relative Influence of Research.  Working 
Paper 215, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Darcy, J. and C-A. Hoffmann (2003) According to Need, Needs Assessment and Decision 
Making in the Humanitarian Sector.  Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Fox, F. (2001) New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century? 
Disasters 25(4): 275–89. 
Grien, T., F. Checci, J.M. Escriba, A. Tamrat, U. Karunakara, C. Stokes, V. Brown and D. 
Legros (2003) Mortality Among Displaced Former UNITA Members and Their Families in 
Angola:  A Retrospective Cluster Survey.  BMJ 327(7416): 650.  
Griekspoor, A. and S. Collins (2001) Raising Standards in Emergency Relief:  How Useful Are 
Sphere Minimum Standards for Humanitarian Assistance.  BMJ 323: 740–42. 
Grünewald, F., C. Pirotte and V. de Geoffroy (2003) Debating Accountability, 
www.urd.org/actu/debating.htm, accessed October. 
HAPi (2003)  Briefing 1. September.  See www.hapgeneva.org, accessed October.  
Mompoint, F. (2000) Using Sphere, Oxfam’s Experience in West Africa.  Humanitarian 
Exchange No. 17, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Perrin, P. (April 2002) War and Accountability – Accountability: A Framework.  ICRC, Geneva. 
Ridley, M. (1993) The Red Queen, Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature.  Penguin, London. 
Salama, P., N. Buzard and P. Spiegel (2001) Letters to the editor.  JAMA 286: 531–2.   
Schenkenburg van Mierop,  E. (2001) ICVA Talk Back, 28 June, www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf, 
accessed October 2003. 
Slim, H. (2002) Claiming a Humanitarian Imperative, NGOs and the Cultivation of 
Humanitarian Duty.  Refugee Quarterly Survey 21(3): 113–25. 
Sphere Project (2003) Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.  See  
www.sphereproject.org, accessed October 2003.    Questionable Accountability:  MSF and Sphere in 2003   189     
   
 
 
Stoddard, A. (2003) Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends.  HPG Report on 
Humanitarian Action and the Global War on Terror: A Review of Trends and Issues, 
Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Terry, F. (2002) Condemned to Repeat, The Paradox of Humanitarian Action.  Cornell 
University Press, New York. 
—— (2000) The Limits and Risks of Regulation Mechanisms for Humanitarian Action. 
Humanitarian Exchange No. 17, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Vila San Juan, R. (2003) MSF Secretary-General, Letter to the Field (25 March).  MSF 
International office, Brussels.  
Van Brabant, K. (2000) Regaining Perspective: The Debate over Quality, Assurance and 
Accountability.  Humanitarian Exchange No. 17, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
 
Address for correspondence:  Programmes Unit, Médecins Sans Frontières UK, 
3rd Floor, 67-74 Saffron Hill, Lonsdon, EC1N 8QX, UK.  E-mail:   
<<jacqui.TONG@london.msf.org>> 
 
 
 
 